For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union teetered on the brink of a nuclear exchange after the Soviets placed intermediate-range missiles on the island of Cuba. U.S. forces were poised at red alert while the Soviets pledged to launch nuclear weapons if the island was invaded. As the world watched anxiously, President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev negotiated a truce that averted disaster. Throughout this tense period, Kennedy and his closest advisors planned their strategy carefully, while--unknown to all but Kennedy, his secretary, and possibly his brother Robert--the historic discussions were being taped by hidden microphones placed in the Oval Office. More than 23 hours of meetings and telephone calls were recorded, all of which have been painstakingly transcribed and documented in The Kennedy Tapes, providing an intimate perspective on the decision- making process and the personalities involved. Enhanced by the commentary and analysis of historians Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, this volume is the essential reader on the Cuban missile crisis
For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union teetered on the brink of a nuclear exchange after the Soviets placed intermediate-range missiles on the island of Cuba. U.S. forces were poised at red alert while the Soviets pledged to launch nuclear weapons if the island was invaded. As the world watched anxiously, President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev negotiated a truce that averted disaster. Throughout this tense period, Kennedy and his closest advisors planned their strategy carefully, while--unknown to all but Kennedy, his secretary, and possibly his brother Robert--the historic discussions were being taped by hidden microphones placed in the Oval Office. More than 23 hours of meetings and telephone calls were recorded, all of which have been painstakingly transcribed and documented in The Kennedy Tapes, providing an intimate perspective on the decision- making process and the personalities involved. Enhanced by the commentary and analysis of historians Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, this volume is the essential reader on the Cuban missile crisis
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1997 tarihinde, Harvard University Press tarafından yayınlandı